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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court is the proper court to hear this appeal
from a Third District Probate Order declaring Ruth Elizabeth Ashton
to be the only heir of the Estate of Kenneth Ashton (893900184ES) .

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Did the trial court err in finding Ruth Elizabeth Ashton
received a fee simple absolute as the sole heir of her husband's
Estate when the Will provided:
V
I give, devise, and bequeath all of my property,
real, personal, or mixed, of whatsoever nature and
wherever situated, which I may own or have the right to
dispose of at the time of my death to ray beloved wife,
Ruth Elizabeth Ashton. She shall have the full enjoyment
of the estate for as long as she desires or shall live.

STATEMENT OF CASE
Decedent and Thelma, his first wife, met Ruth Elizabeth Ashton
in early 1980 (R138, page 9, line 17). After his first wife died
(R137, page 6, line 17), Ken married Ruth on August 30, 1985.

Ken

and Ruth were married for three years, four months, and five days
(R135, page 11, line 8) until, on January 5, 1989, after a short
illness, Ken committed suicide (R138, page 19, lines 7ff).
Mr. Ashton died owning probate assets worth $38,002.85 and
non-probate assets of $163,297.30 (R138, page 45, line 12ff; R 138,
exhibit 4; R89-94) .

His probate was commenced by his son seven

weeks after his father's death.

The original probate requested

that children be appointed Personal Representatives (R4-7).

Ruth

Ashton objected to the appointment of children as Personal Repre-
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sentatives because she was named in the Will and was preferred
under the Utah statute (Rll-14).

Ruth Ashton became the Personal

Representative (R28-33), and the trial court (Judge Raymond Uno)
found that Kenneth Ashton, through his Will, left his entire estate
to his wife, Ruth Elizabeth Ashton, "free and absolute of the claim
of any other heir."

(R125)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
All of the evidence presented before this court was found by
the District Court to result in a fee simple absolute estate in
Ruth Ashton as the sole heir. At the trial court level, Appellants
never

submitted

facts to be

found

by

the

District

Court

nor

objected to any fact other than the ultimate legal conclusion of
heirship.
Appellants1 cases (cited in their current Brief) are distinguishable from the present case and set no legal precedent for the
Utah courts to apply.

These opinions represent eclectic, isolated

views on the importance of supporting the trier of fact in its
findings of fact and its interpretations of various testamentary
language.
Even

if the Supreme Court of Utah wishes to express

its

opinion of the Testator's intent, a fee simple interest would be
found

in Respondent because it would be most favored, logical

construction of the Will as a whole.
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ARGUMENT
I.

A trier of fact properly has determined heirship from all

evidence submitted.
A.

Questions of Fact

Appellants state that the trial court erred by finding a fee
simple interest when the language in the Will said, "for as long
as she desires or shall live" (Brief, page 2, lines 1-5). Appellants contend that this language is clear that "Ruth Ashton was
given assets for life" (Brief, page 4, line 13).
This trial court error is of fact or of law.

The District

Court judges, as triers of fact, have original jurisdiction in all
matters not elsewhere provided
Article VIII, Section 5 ) .

by

statute

(Utah Constitution,

This extends jurisdiction to matters

relating to the estates of decedents, including construction of
wills and determinations of heirs and successors of decedents (UCA
75-1-302 (l)(a)).

Appellants have inferentially argued thait there

was

factual

insufficient

evidence

for

the

Court's

decision,

(Brief, page 2, top), and directly argue that the trial court did
not correctly

find the

facts of the Testator's

intent which,

therefore, would have led the Court to correctly find the life
estate

that was

mandated

by

the

Will's

language, the

Will's

construction, or the testator's intent (Brief, pages 2-3, Bottom).
The scope of the Supreme Court's appellate review is limited.
The appellate court cannot act as a trial court and receive new
evidence on the facts.

The intent of the Testator was a factual

issue and not the proper subject matter of appeal without a showing
of clear error.

For an appellate court to again consider what was
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Testator's intent behind the Will's construction or his meaning of
words is duplicative and not called for in light of Appellants'
failure to show the District Court's decision was "clearly erroneous11 Inwood Labs vs. Ives Labs, 456 U.S. 844 (1982) . As was stated
in Civil Procedure by Friedenthal:
The reason for using the clearly erroneous standard is
that the trial judge is thought to have an advantage over
the appellate court because of his opportunity to view
the witnesses; demeanor evidence is of course unavailable
to the appellate court. In addition, the trial judge has
been able to sift through the entire case and the
ultimate judgment reached may reflect this familiarity
which may provide much greater insight into the action
than the limited view permitted on appeal of specific
issues or rulings.
The court

found Ruth Elizabeth Ashton was the

sole heir

intended by Decedent to receive a fee simple absolute.

The trial

court judge found a fee simple interest after considering the Will,
files, record memorandum, and evidence.

He was within the scope

of his discretion under 75-2-603 to do this.

Also, Respondent

believes this was a proper finding because the Will had only one
operative section (Section V) with the other non-operative sections
(VI and VII) being based upon the unfulfilled contingency of Ruth
being dead at the time* Ken died.

This finding should be affirmed

unless a mistake of lciw was made.
B.

Questions of Law

The fullest scope of r€>view, not surprisingly, is for errors
of law; the appellate court will decide questions of law de novo.
The Appellants' legal error claim is based on the following:
(1)

Mr. Ashton

intentionally

added

this

second

sentence in Section V from earlier constructions (Brief, page 4,
line 14) ,
4

(2)

an Alabama case held that "during her lifetime"

meant a life estate, (Brief, page 4, line 5 ) ,
(3)

a California case involving a joint and mutual

will using the language "for her use and benefit forever" found a
life estate (Brief, page 4, bottom),
(4)

a New York case held "use" meant less than

legal estate (Brief, page 5, line 2 ) ,
(5)

the construction of Ken's Will indicated his

children were to be provided for (Brief, pages 5-8), and
(6)

a Georgia

case

considered

interpreting

the

entire will as a whole (Brief, page 8, bottom) in order to give
effect to a limitation.
(1)
are

correct

that

The Intent of the Second Sentence.
the second

sentence was

added

Appellants

to the

final

version.
I give, devise, and bequeath all of my property,
real, personal, or mixed, of whatsoever nature and
wherever situated, which I may own or have the right to
dispose of at the time of my death to my beloved wife,
Ruth Elizabeth Ashton.
But, significantly, the first sentence always has existed in
every prior draft.
est.

It clearly grants Ruth an absolute fee inter-

Who, if anyone, does the second sentence restrict?

to have the full enjoyment

of the estate

(given by the first

sentence) for as long as she desires or shall live.
Ruth can fully enjoy the property

Ruth is

Impliedly,

(by selling it, consuming it,

borrowing against it) . She can do this until she no longer desires
it or until she no longer lives.
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Also, having granted Ruth a fee interest by the first sentence, what (if anything) is restricted?
only until she gives it away or dies.

Ruth owns this property

The second sentence does not

restrict this.

If Ruth's alienation of property is restricted, who

is benefited?

There is no remainder over on her death.

All of

Ruth's property will pass under her will.
The Court construed Section V and the Will as creating a fee
simple interest not limited by this language.

In other words, the

Court found Ruth's fee simple interest would be fully enjoyed by
her as long as she desired to so enjoy the property or as long as
she lived to enjoy the property.

No other subsequent interest

existed.
(2)

The Alabama Case.

In South vs. Yager 368 S2d

863 (Ala., 1979), decedent bequeathed all his property to his wife
"during her lifetime" even though there was no clear limitation
over to remaindermen.

The Supreme Court of Alabama sustained the

trial court, finding that the will was unambiguous, and that the
wife had requested for the testator to insert this language during
her lifetime.
Just as the Alabama Supreme Court supported it's trial court
after pleadings, briefs, and depositions, the Supreme Court of Utah
should

support

it's District

Court decision

of a

fee simple.

Unlike the Alabama case, after weighing the language giving Ruth
the fee in the first sentence, and "the full enjoyment" in the
second sentence, with all Court "files, records, memorandums, and
evidence introduced at trial" (R26), the Court found a fee inter-
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est.

This Finding of Fact should be supported

on appeal

for

reasons given above.
Appellants

cite this Alabama

case, which

used

the

words

"lifetime," as precedent in Utah for establishing a rule of will
construction

for

omitted

remaindermen.

Appellants

want

the

operative language to be "or shall live." Appellants want the Will
interpreted that Ken's intent is clear (Brief, Page 4, line 19) to
show a life estate for Ruth even though no remaindermen are named.
Appellants are wrong on the case.

The Alabama court itself

said it would not apply rules of construction against the clearly
expressed intention of the testator as found by the trial court
(Infra at 864).
Further, Appellants1 finding of clear intent of Ken is not
borne out by the record.

Mr. Ashton ! s language for a life estate

was not expressed clearly, nor was his intent to create a life
estate expressed to others.

In the deposition of the attorney

drafting the Will, Carolyn Driscoll, she stated she did not believe
the language was intended to create a life estate (R137, page 15,
line 7ff).

She reiterated that in her testimony in Court (R136,

page 16, line 7, to page 20, line 5 ) .
Q.

(Mr. Borsos)
Did Mr. Ashton know the difference between the life estate and absolute
grant in fee?

A.

(Carolyn Driscoll) I believe he did.
page 17, lines 12-15)

Q.

Did Mr. Ashton in any of his communications to
you indicate that he wanted a life estate in
Ruth?

A.

No.

(R136, page 20, lines 2-5)
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(R136,

The judge could have relied on this testimony to show Ken's
unclear intent.

According to the Will, Carolyn's responsibility

was to make any "clarifications concerning the Will" (Will, Section
XI, page 8, line 11).

The judge could also have relied on the

indefinite language of "full enjoyment" and "desires and lives" to
find that a life estate was not clearly intended.
(3)

The California case.

In re Cooper 78 Cal.

Rptr. 740 (Calif., 1969), involved a husband and wife executing a
joint and mutual will which provided that property went to the
survivor "for his or her own use and benefit forever" and then on
the survivor's death to named people.
covenanted not to revoke the will.
claimed

a life estate.

Husband

and wife also

The husband died and the wife

However, the husband's

probate

court

distribution decree appeared to grant an absolute interest and not
a life estate.
The California inheritance tax people again wanted to tax the
named people in the wife's estate, but this time as though the wife
owned a fee interest and all inheritance came from her and not the
former husband.

The appellate court found that, under California

Inheritance Tax laws, the earlier husband's inheritance tax return
with the wife claiming a life estate was proper.

Thus, the second

tax assessed under a life estate finding was proper.
The trial court found that the husband's estate order distributing all property to the wife did not convey more than a life
estate.

The trial court agreed with the wife's executrix "on the

ground Bessie Cooper had only a life estate in the assets" (at page

8

742) .

The appellate court sustained the trial court and allowed

the reduced tax assessment.
The California

case

involved

a joint will

signed by

the

husband and wife, a will which was never changed after the husband's death, a promise never to revoke the will, a claim by the
wife that she was not more than a life tenant under the joint will,
the payment of inheritance taxes as though the wife were a life
tenant, and finally, the death of the wife without changing her
will, leaving her property to the same remainderman named in the
same joint and mutual will that had been declared in her husband f s
estate to grant her a life estate.
In the present case, Ruth Ashton never has claimed a life
estate.

There was no joint or mutual will.

claimed a fee interest.
interest.

Ruth has always

A probate court found she had a fee

No will provision nor contract prevented revocation of

the survivor's will nor promised to maintain the will.

No irrevoc-

able joint or mutual will provisions existed providing for alternative dispositions to the same beneficiaries on the death of both
Ken and Ruth as required under Utah law (UCA 75-2-70).
The California case interpreted final court probate orders for
tax purposes holding (a) that trial court orders should be sustained if facts for them exist and (b) that the will as a whole
should be used to construe any particular language.

Respondent

agrees to both positions.
(4)

The New York case.

In re. Brandsteinfs Estate

150 NY S2d 911 (New York, 1956) defines the word "use" as a word
of art "to mean life estate," but also the New York court found the
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word

"use" to mean occupancy of property

(at 913) and stated,

"However, this Testator's intention was to create a trust and not
legal life estates" (at 912).
Appellants1 analogy of this case to the present is unclear.
Ken did not employ the word "use" in his Will.

Ruth has the "full

enjoyment of the estate for as long as she desires or shall live,"
and not mere "occupancy" (not full enjoyment) of a home or any
other asset.

Ken did not write the word "use."

case found the word

If the New York

"use" to be words of limitcition, then do

Appellants imply that, in the present case involving the words
"full enjoyment," we are also limited because "use" means "full
enjoyment"?

Appellants do not say how the words "use" and "full

enjoyment" are related.

Finally, if Appellants are right that the

word "use" is a word of art implying a less than legal estate, then
did Ken's failure to employ that word of art create* a fee estate?
Certainly it must create more than a life estate.
(5)

The structure of the Will.

(Appellants' Brief,

pages 5 and 6) indicates that only in Section V is there a dispositive grant.

Section VI begins with the words:

"In the event that

my wife, Ruth Elizabeth Ashton, shall die..."; and Section VII
begins (page 4) "should my wife. . . predecease me or die at the same
time."

Both sections dealing with the contingency of Ruth's death

had to have been found by the Trial Court to be inoperative or else
someone else would have been found sharing the estate with Ruth.
The Appellants stressed the fact that Decedent had a "detailed
scheme to provide for his offspring" (Brief, page 7, line 2 ) , and
Ken also had the contingency that, if Ruth could not serve as
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Personal Representative, joint alternate Personal Representatives
from each family would stand on unequal footing, (eg. the one from
Ken's family has a veto power over the other, Brief, page 7 ) .
Appellants cite no authority for any inference to be drawn from
this anomaly.

All these provisions are not effective if Ruth is

alive.
Appellants argue (Brief, page 9) that Ken "was concerned about
his children being beneficiaries under his Will" and "this concern
is incompatible with Ruth's fee interest" (Brief, page 9, line 2 ) .
But, there is no incompatibility between the contingent remainder
to the children if Ruth were dead and the total grant to Ruth of
everything if she lived.

The trial court reviewed the whole Will

and found a fee interest in Ruth.

Respondent agrees with the trial

court and finds this interpretation consistent with the structure
of the Will.

Ken loved his children, Ruth, and Ruth's children.

He provided first for Ruth and gave her everything.

But, if she

were dead, Ken gave the most to his children and then to her
children.
Ken could have said that Sections VI and VII remainderman
"take after Ruth's life estate," but he didn't say that.

What he

said was that Ruth gets "all of my property" in Section V, and if
Ruth is dead, then property is to go according to Section VI and
VII.

Ruth is named Personal Representative alive, but if Ruth is

dead or does not wish to serve then under Section X, other coPersonal Representatives are to act unequally as instructed.

The

Trial Court would have been wrong to have ignored the contingency
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at the beginning of each Section VI, VII, and X and found an intent
to create a life estate from contingency provisions.
(6)

The Georgia case.

Tucker vs. Black

315 S.E.

2d 910 (Georgia, 1984) involved the testator's provision devising
land to his wife and son for life and then "it shall go to the
children of my said son."

Yet testator in another section devised

property to his wife and son "without limitation."

The trial court

held a life estate was created and the entire will needed to be
constructed to reconcile this.

The appeals court agreed.

Respondent agrees that the whole Will needs to be considered,
and for the reasons expressed in this Brief this would mean Ruth
gets a fee interest.
II •

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were not

objected to by the Appellants.
On November 22, 1989, Respondent's attorney sent Appellants'
attorney the copy of the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.

On December 1, 1989, Judge Raymond Uno signed the Findings

of Fact and Order.

On December 27, 1989, Appellants filed their

Notice of Appeal.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

(Rule 52

(6)) provide that

within ten days from entry of judgment, the Findings of Fact may
be entered.

Appellants did not seek redress of deficiencies in the

Findings or Conclusions of Law. Having not contested them earlier,
they stand correct.
irrelevant.

They may be of little weight, but they are not

Further,

if

Appellants

wanted

certain

findings

included in the order, the appropriate means to so would have been

12

by request to the trial court for inclusion of facts or for objection to the facts proposed.

Appellants did neither.

III. Legal construction of Will grants a fee simple interest.
A.

Most logical construction is of a fee interest:

The grant of a fee interest in the first sentence of Section
V is clear.

The second sentence may have several interpretations.
(1)

Court

has

First, it may be surplusage.

indicated

that

subsequent

The Utah Supreme

testamentary

expressions

limiting a clearly granted estate must be equally clear.

In re.

Campbell's Estate, [27 UT 361, (1904) (quoted R114)], stated
"Where the intention of the Testator in respect
to the particular matter is clearly expressed
by the terms of the will any subsequent expression of intent or by the Testator must, in
order to limit the prior expression of intention, be equally clear and intelligible, and
indicate an intention to that effect with
reasonable certainty."
Respondent knows of no case holding the words "full enjoyment"
or "desire" as words of limitation.
live" could be words of limitation.

Perhaps the words "or shall
The text and context of those

words needs to be reviewed.
In the

context

of

the

sentence

or

section,

predicatory and not required words of limitation.

they

appear

In the sentence,

they form the disjunctive with "desires" modifying "full enjoyment."

This could be expressive, as Carolyn Driscoll claimed, of

the intent not to create a life estate (R136, page 7, lines 12-15
and lines 2-5).

Similarly, the section could have been read to

restate the obvious truth that Ruth, having gotten a fee interest
from the first sentence, now fully enjoys it for as long as she
desires or for as long as she lives.
13

What happens when Ruth dies?
Section V.
happens.

Mr. Ashton doesn't tell us in

Appellants claim Sections VI and VII tell us what

Respondent believes these sections do not operate if Ruth

is alive at Ken f s death, and they certainly could not pass Ruth's
property at her death.
(2)

Her will would do that.

Second, these words "or shall live" do not

delimit a traditional life estate.

Even if Appellants are right

that the language means Ruth enjoys the property for life, she
fully enjoys the property.
is explained supra).

Full enjoyment is more than "use" (as

Ruth has everything (i.e. "all") by the first

sentence and "full enjoyment" by the second.

If "or shall live"

are words of limitation, does this mean Ruth can fully enjoy not
just income but capital gains?

Can she fully enjoy the homes for

life and commit waste?

Can she fully enjoy the property and make

imprudent investments?

Can she remarry and fully use the property

to support herself and others?
Respondent thinks so.

Decedent left no explicit instructions

to the contrary and, in fact, repeatedly indicated he wanted his
wife well cared for by non-probate transfers.

(Consider that,

aside from this Will cind the first sentence of Section V, the bulk
of the assets passed

outside of probate directly

to his wife

through insurance and employment benefits) (R138, Exhibit 4, R89)
(R135, page 38, line 24ff).
(3)
(and

discussed

by

Third, Appellants' cases cited in their Brief
Respondent,

infra,

different life estates than Ken's.

page

5ff)

describe

far

The Alabama case involved a

clear, unambiguous expression of a life interest (i.e. "during a
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lifetime") which had been inserted in the husbandfs will at the
request of his wife-

The California case involved an irrevocable

joint and mutual will specifying a life estate followed by an
irrevocable remainder interest-

There the wife actually claimed

a life estate in her husband's estate.

The New York case defined

"use" as a word of art creating a life estate whenever it was
employed.

The Georgia case gave a life estate and remainder in one

section and a fee in another section.
(4)
remainder?

If Ruth

gets

a life

estate, who

gets

the

According to Section VI, those surviving children of

Ken get 9 3 percent

(which percentage

is periodically

adjusted

downward by "Addendum Number 1") and those surviving children of
Ruth get 7 percent (upward adjusted).

Based on Decedent's formula

(R138, page 25, line 13ff, exhibits 2 and 3 ) , Ruth's testimony was
that

these

computations

by

Ken were

based

on

conservative estimates to create family harmony

optimistic

and

(R138, page 30,

lines 2-20).
Appellants claimed Ken's "taking care of his children was a
major concern" (Brief, page 8, lines 9 and 10) to him, and this
implied Ruth was to get

a life estate.

However, even under

Appellants' view, Ken's Will does not take care of all his children—only those children who survive Ruth.
The remainder

(if it is a remainder) is not an absolutely

vested remainder. The Will makes the remainder contingent, because
the remaindermen do not enjoy their interest whenever and however
the prior estate terminates.

Rather, they would take (if they

survive Ruth and Ken) whatever percentage interest existed at the
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But suppose at Ken f s death Ruth

moment of their father's decith.

gets only a life estate followed by a remainder to the children.
The remainder is still not vested.

In other words, the children's

interest (if it is a remainder) is not determined until after Ken's
and Ruth's deaths when both the percentages of the children's
participation

(see Amendment No. 1) and the survival

children) is determined.

(of which

If all children died before Ruth, then

an intestacy has occurred, because there are no surviving heirs of
Ken.

If all Ken's children or Ruth's children die, then there is

an intestacy of that class.
In construing the language of a will, an interpretation which
will prevent a partial intestacy is desirable.
cases cited

in a North Carolina

For that reason,

Law Review Article

(12 North

Carolina Law Review 324) (R110-111), resulted in a finding of a
fee interest even though the language indicates a life estate.

For

example, the language, M to her heirs and assigns for her lifetime,"
"to be used by her so long as she lives and enjoys the same," "to
be in fee simple for life," "to be for h€>r lifetime, to manage and
dispose of as she may see cause," all created fee interests.
B.

A fee simple absolute interest is the most favored

legal construction for this kind of "full enjoyment" life estate
(if a life estate is found to have been intended by Ken).
(1)
sentence

A

life estate:

Kern granted

and, under Appellants' view,

in the

a fee

second

in one
sentence

restricted it to Ruth's full enjoyment during her desires and her
lifetime.

If this is a life estate, Ruth has the "full enjoyment"

of the estate.

In Simes on Future Interest, Section 893 (R117),
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Simes discusses this situation by giving three possible constructions to the language (e.g., "fully enjoy11):
(a)

Find a fee simple was intended if the will

does not specify the estate granted and gives an unrestricted,
express power to dispose of the fee.
(b)

Find a life estate was meant if the will

stated only a life estate being given and treat the "fee" language
as mere surplusage.
(c)

Find a fee simple interest (even if life

estate language exists) because the additional language gave the
power to dispose of the fee and this is what the testator wanted.
Simes prefers the last construction of life estates to give
effect to all the language.

In our case, if Appellants1 view is

correct and the "full enjoyment" granted by the second sentence
and the full fee grant of the first are mere surplusage and add
nothing to the gift of the life estate, then "it's difficult to see
why it was inserted."

Therefore, a construction to the effect that

the power involves an interest more extensive than the life estate
should be presumed," (i.e., a fee simple absolute).
Especially in our case, finding a fee construction invests
Ruth with immediate control, prevents intestacy, and gives effect
to 99 percent of the words in Section V of the Will, making the
contingent sections consistent on the alternative disposition if
Ruth had died before Ken.
(2)

An Executory Interest.

This estate may be

granting a fee in Ruth with an executory interest over to the
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children which springs into use when the elapsed time has occurred
and whenever and however the prior estate terminates.
Appellants make this argument

(Brief, pages 9-10)

inferen-

tially by claiming that Ruth has a life estate and then, on her
death, (depending when it is) those children who survive her will
take certain percentages (depending on which year they inherit).
Before her death, Ruth could have the power to "fully enjoy" (i.e.
consume) , but she doesn't have the power to will the property away.
Under this interpretation, how could the childrenfs interests
be evaluated with certainty?

Disregarding the issue of whether

Ruth has the power to change her will

(which is the subject of

another lawsuit, Ashton vs. Ashton, Civil No. 89090456, Third
District Court, Judge Riqtrup, and which may come before this Court
at a subsequent time), the executory interest in certain children
may be so remote that the trial court was justified in finding a
fee in Ruth.

Certainly, if all of the children were dead, one

Court has found that this ripened the life estate of the wife into
a fee [Chambers vs. Shaw, 12 NW 223, 225 (Michigan, 1985)] where
testator granted to the wife for her life and then to "heirs of my
body" and the testator's only son died without issue*.
(3)

Similar constructions could have been made of

this estate:
(a)

A

life estate

in Ruth and

contingent

remainder to those children surviving Ruth in varying percentages
(depending on when Ruth died) with alternative remainder to heirs
of Ken or Ruth if the children did not survive.
children's position.)
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(This is the

(b)

A life estate in Ruth with power in her

to consume the entire estate and then contingent remainder to the
children as in (a).
(c)

A determinable fee in Ruth subject to

divestment upon her death (if she left property from Ken's estate) .
(d)

An absolute fee in Ruth with contingent

alternative fee dispositions (if Ruth had not survived Ken) to the
children (Respondent's position,)
Ken could have helped with finding any of the foregoing.

His

failure to expressly limit Ruth's estate by remainders ov€*r causes
confusion.

The trial court was within the ambit of its authority

to recognize this and find a fee in Ruth.

For the Supreme Court

to re-write Ken's Will would be very improper.
C.

Utah law favors reading a will as unambiguous.

Under the Will, Ruth was granted certain unrestricted enjoyment in Section V.

No one else is granted that immediate enjoy-

ment. Others must first survive for a certain number of years and
also survive Ruth and each other to enjoy their portion of the
contingent share.

There is not ambiguity, as the trial court

found, if the Will views the grant to the children as contingent
and the grant to Ruth as absolute.
As quoted infra, In re. Campbell's Estate requires that, if
a clearly expressed intention is found in one place, then this can
only be limited by a clearly expressed limitation elsewhere.

Ken's

Will does not state a limitation of a clearly vested remainder.
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CONCLUSION
Appellants claim the Will on its face is clear in granting
Ruth only a life estate (Brief, page 12, line 1) or, if the factual
situation is looked at, a life estate determination is necessary
to have the Testator's concern "more clearly met."
Appellants have lost their mother and father and view the Will
as an expression of their father's love for them.

But the Will is

also an expression of Ken's love for Ruth, Under Appellants' view,
Ruth at least receives the full enjoyment of the property, while
Ken's and Ruth's children are only contingently provided for in
subsequent sections of the Will.

Just a legal interpretation of

the language of the Will would give Ruth a fee simple absolute.
But such an interpretation is consistent with the testimony and
background.
inheritance.

Clearly Ruth is to be favored by the Will and in all
Only after her death are percentages to be adjusted

between Ken's children and Ruth's children.

These "remainders"

could be thought of as the trial court might have, as divesting or
limiting

Ruth, but

only

as

settling

Ruth's

and

Ken's

family

disputes if both were to die together or close together.
This Court should sustain the trial court's Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law when no error of finding is alleged and
there exists valid rationale for having made a decision within the
ambit of authority.
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